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ACCOUNTING, TRANSPARENCY AND 
“TRANSLATION” : THE CASE OF HUMANITARIAN CROSS 
CULTURAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Abstract  
 We have conducted a field research on philanthropic “tsunami” projects in South-
eastern India that are embedded in a quiet complex governance scheme (French Firm funding, 
execution by local NGOs, consolidated management by a French federation of NGOs), in 
which the classical notions of fraud and transparency prove to very ambiguous, so that 
accounting cannot be the main source of control. We show that the opacity of events at 
microscopic operational level is a mandatory condition for institutionalization of accounted 
“facts”. Therefore, we establish the importance of “translation” effects in the sense of Actor 
Network Theory (ANT). Beyond transparency that translation institutionalizes trough 
accounts, we raise an irreducible part of ignorance and incertitude that necessarily comes with 
every attempt to build knowledge for governance.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Management and economy research deliver more and more finings about NGO 
effectiveness and efficiency in developing countries. Issues as well as diagnoses are various. 
For example, in Bangladesh, some studies tend to show that NGO Primary health care in rural 
areas are quite effective (Mercer & al., 2004), whereas rural poverty alleviation is considered 
by other scientists as not very successful, or at least with a lower impact than claimed by 
NGOs Themselves (Ullah & Routray, 2007). Studies conducted in Pakistan show that the 
success of NGO schools, although it proves to be much greater than the one of public schools, 
may also vary, according to management and leadership factors (Khan & al., 2005).  Other 
factors like cost efficiency and cost analyses (Routh & al., 2004), logistic coordination 
(Chandes & Paché, 2006) or field workers career management (Ahmad, 2007) have been 
taken into consideration by researcher. Finally, effectiveness and efficiency of NGOs and 
NGO agents appears as complex and multifactorial. Thus, the issues of transparency and 
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measures of efficiency look all the more important, as a basic source of self assessment, 
benchmarks, and future improvements for NGO practices in developing countries. 
 Transparency has become a more and more acute topic for philanthropic activities, not 
only because it represents one of the key principles acknowledged by mainstream liberal 
governance (PESQUEUX, 2007 : 86) but also because of the sensitivity of NGO resources 
concerning image. This is particularly the case when corporations fund non-profit NGOs 
(PIQUET & TOBELEM, 2006), by which they engage corporate image towards most of their 
stakeholders. 
 Many regulation devices are at disposal to avoid fraud, corruption and to warrant 
traceability and accountability
1
, building as such a sort of emerging soft law of philanthropic 
NGOs. However, corporate scandals have proven that no reporting, as sophisticated as it may 
be, is sufficient to eradicate fraud. Informative or normative bubbles that make decision 
makers even more blind and mimetic, as it appeared through the 2007-2008 banking system 
crises (JARDAT & BONED, 2008) may paradoxically affect governance instruments. In the case 
of corporate cross-cultural philanthropy, the irruption of management control and audit tools 
may jeopardize projects by confining decision makers in a set of figures and models that 
replace the reality. This may be particularly the case when projects are launched in reaction to 
unexpected events such as a tsunami, because data collection is quite problematic. In 
informative bubbles, one may be tempted to elaborate decisions that will prove to be too 
sophisticated compared with the accuracy of the data about a) non-accountable aspects as 
long-term economic impact, b) unexpected feedbacks due to local social structure and culture 
or c) specific conditions of implementation. If we consider the distance - in the 
multidimensional sense proposed by proximity economics (GILLY & TORRE, 2000 : 24)- 
between actions in the field and top governance,  its is likely that the wider the distance is, the 
greater the irrelevance of sophisticated figures is.  Indeed the finality of the projects consists 
in really providing people with better sustainable life conditions, and not only in accounting. 
 An in the field study of philanthropic projects implemented in South-eastern India 
after the 2004 tsunami tends to prove that, on the contrary, a good project may be 
institutionnalized by a lot of minor and permanent gaps and transgressions. These 
inconsistencies are not taken into consideration by the management control;  they belong to 
minimal level of latitude that one must grant to operational implementation. Moreover, such 
irregularities tend to allow and amplify the impact of philanthropic actions, as far as they 
                                                 
1
 See for example (FPH, 2005) and (Wyatt, 2004). 
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belong to the “translation” process anticipated by the Actor Network Theory (ANT) of 
(AKRICH, CALLON & LATOUR, 2006).  
 In this paper, we firstly give an insight on the main notions and theorems of ANT, and 
on consequences for the interpretation of our case study. Secondly, we use ANT to understand 
the surprises and tensions experienced by the pilots of the so called “tsunami” project, as 
paradoxical transparency dialectics. Thirdly, we interpret these findings in terms of “liberal 
governmentality” in the sense of Michel Foucault (FOUCAULT, 2006a, 2006b). 
1.  INSIGHTS ABOUT ACTOR NETWORK THEORY : WHY IT IS APPROPRIATE 
TO THE STUDY OF COMPLEX CROSS-CULTURAL PROJECTS 
 ANT considers projects, organizations, scientific discoveries or innovation as a 
knowledge and action networking. Flows of knowledge converge towards priviledged nodes 
of the network, called “computing centers”, which integrate them in a process that is called 
“science2” or “politics3” or “law making4”. The network connects as well human (like 
workers, managers, scientists) as not human “actors” (scientific instruments, machines, 
nature, printers), and the connection consists in symbolic scripts that make them (virtually) 
present in the place in which they are computed. ANT allows explaining some complex socio-
technical phenomena through measurable characteristics of the network, such as the number 
of inter-related nodes or the network topology. For example a series of contradictory public 
policies become through ANT obvious strategic attitudes of decision makers (LATOUR, 
2006b), whereas scientific revolutions become less mysterious if we only take new 
networking opportunities into consideration (LATOUR, 2006a : 47). 
 Networks are built by mediators, who manage to “recruit” other actors inside the net, 
which is possible only if the former are able to make their interests in accordance with the 
latter’s ones. That is, recruiting a new member for the network implies “translating” his own 
interests into the sought member’s one, so that the latter will naturally accept to be part of this 
net.  Translation is both a semiotic process and a transformation of what this semiotics refers 
to, as far as compromises are necessary to make various interests compatible. For example, 
Bruno Latour explains how Pasteur was obliged to alter many projects in order to develop his 
anti-diphtery vaccine. In a first version, physicians considered the vaccine as a thread because 
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 (LATOUR, 2005) 
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 (LATOUR, 2006b) 
4
 (LATOUR, 2004) 
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it was supposed to be a substitute for doctors. As soon as Pasteur added serum to the vaccine, 
he gave a more valuable role (and source of revenue) to general practitioners, so that his 
innovation became a widespread success (LATOUR, 2001).  ANT users frequently visualize 
the progress of translations through the so-called “front line” of a project, that is the 
boundaries of project that is moving in the two-dimensional space of the nature of the project 
(dimension 1) and the actors it manages to recruit (dimension 2).  In the latter example with 
Pasteurs’s anti-diphteric device, this front line shows that is not possible to recruit reluctant 
actors without modifying – as minor as these modifications may be - the nature of the project 
(see fig. 1 below) 
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Fig. 1: the front line of the “anti-diphteric vaccine project” of Pasteur [translated from 
(LATOUR, 2001)]. 
 
 On the one hand, translation alters (be this alteration only reduction / abstraction), but 
on the other hand, translation preserves. Latour explains modernity by the “complication” that 
information storage allows. Administration, written law, science handbooks, and other fixed 
symbolic tracks produced by modern societies make every one member of power networks, in 
which he (she) knows precisely what to do and not to do. Without circulation of all these 
strings of symbols (ANT call them “scripts”), people would have to perform social structure 
and scientific knowledge at any moment with a high level of incertitude, which would 
drastically restrict the level of specialization of human activities. STRUM & LATOUR (2006) 
establish a continuum of social “complication” from baboon societies to industrial human 
societies, inside which every step of modernization is correlated to new capabilities of 
information storage and new extents of scripts circulations. In particular, metrological 
networks (clocks, measuring instruments, accounting, statistics …) play a vital role in the 
maintenance of our ability to perform elaborated collective activities related to our 
technologies. 
 That is why “translation” may be the key issue to study philanthropic projects that are 
both sponsored by a French firm and implemented in a very distant, foreign and not 
industrialized society. Whereas firm’s managers are used to deal with highly precise 
metrological networks supported by accounting, Indian villages are still embedded in oral 
Cooperation
Pasteur + Vaccine
Modifications of 
techniques
Pasteur + Roux + Antidiphteric serum + Practitioners
Practitioners
Allies Opponents
FRONT LINE
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culture and a set of social regulations that are at the same time less complicate and more 
complex than European industrial ones. Thus project management may appear here as an 
attempt to connect two very different types of actor networks through the circulation of 
metrological scripts (accounting) that are not designed for use in one of these two networks. 
From ANT point of view, the key issue is not any “civilization shock” between industrialized 
Europe and rural India, but: 
 on the one hand, the ability of countrymen to translate their complex needs into the 
complicate metrological expectation of  industrialized sponsors, 
 on the other hand, the information bubble that firm managers could develop if they are too 
confident in the power offered by project management tools. This would make them take 
decisions that do not produce the expected impact for populations, because the 
performative effects they are used to in a fully industrialized environment do not happen 
when connected to heterogeneous actor sub-networks. 
Through such a lens, one may consider transparency and governance as virtuous concerns as 
well as noxious illusions of power and indicator’s fetishism. 
 
  
 
2. THE « TSUNAMI PROJECT » AND ITS FRONT LINE : TRANSPARENCY TROUGH 
TRANSLATION AND TRAHISON 
  Few days after the tsunami tragedy (December 2004), the superstore owners of a 
major French retailing group decide to launch solidarity operation. Each client passing 
through store cash registers is going to offer one euro for victim’s rescue, whereas store 
owner are going to supplement each euro donated by clients with one euro coming from their 
own cash. Within two weeks the group collect € 2,6 million and create a stirring committee to 
allocate money and exert governance of projects that are supposed to last 3 to 5 years. Project 
top management is attributed to a French federation of NGOs, from which two leaders 
become members of the steering committee. Most of the projects are going to be implemented 
in South-eastern India, where the Group has for years established relationships with sub-
contractants
5
. Moreover, the French Federation of NGOs, which is specialized in childhood 
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 That is very common when firms do sponsorship related to environmental and social responsibility 
(GILORMINI, 2008) 
 7 
protection, has already conducted former projects in partnership with the French retailing 
group and local NGO partners. The role of the steering committee consists in confirming the 
launch of projects, scrutinizing the consistency of their aims and realization, and re-allocating 
funds to new projects or from one project to another one. The project top manager accounts 
for the progress of projects and fund use, on the basis of inspections and reports that he 
periodically receives from local NGOs that operate the projects. He also prepares and 
accompanies the annual in the field inspections of the steering committee. 
Methodology 
 This research has been conducted through reports study and semi-directed interviews 
that took place as well in India as in Europe, within one year. Detailed list of interviews and 
observations is at disposal in Appendix 1. We designed data collection to track the 
metrological and qualitative scripts by which the projects are managed and governed, from 
distant beneficiaries up to the top governance of the “tsunami” initiative. The field of the 
study was restricted to a bundle of Tamil Nadu (South-eastern India) projects (Sri Lanka and 
Thailand areas were not investigated), for research resources reasons. Interviews inside 
villages were conducted through Tamil-English interpreters belonging to local NGOs and we 
take this bias into account. According to Martha Feldman’s scheme (FELDMAN, 2003) we 
used ANT for organizational studies by scoping ostensive, performative and artefact aspect of 
practices. Concerning the latter aspect, we particularly scrutinized the processes of in-
scription and de-scription in the sense of AKRICH & LATOUR (1991), and asked steering 
committee members questions concerning the governance in its extended definition 
(PESQUEUX, 2007: 26). 
Research Results 
Retrospectively, it appears that the implementation of the local projects was quite fast (within 
the 6 months following tsunami) if we take into consideration the usual temporality of local 
NGOs that are used to long term work (local NGO interviews). The French project top 
manager has played a vital role in the “recruiting” process, thanks to his relationships 
formerly established with NGO. He was the principal “translator” in the sense of ANT, who 
managed to make equivalent the concerns of multiple actors (human actors as well as not 
human actors like institutions or tools):  
 French superstores group who want funds to be dedicated only to tsunami victims, 
because philanthropy deontology obliges them to use money exactly for the purpose that 
was announced to donators 
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 Many emergency NGOs6 that firstly come without coordination in the field and draw 
quickly the boundaries of what money will not be used for by sustainability oriented 
NGO’s 
 Local NGOs who want to scope the most deprived populations, precisely where 
government aid, casts solidarity and humanitarian “rush” are not present. 
 European and Indian federal governance levels of these NGOs, who have to respect their 
own aims, their own official values, their charts, sometimes their Weltanschaung as 
exposed by KILBY (2006) in his study of 15 Indian NGOs. 
 A French NGO Federation that its deontology allows only to take care on children 
 Countrymen that belong to complex local social regulations, among which strong 
communitarian links within the village, particularly performed through the meetings of the 
official village elected council the so-called Panchayat, without whom nothing can 
happen 
 Banks whom government allocates some credit lines exclusively for microfinance purpose 
on condition that they are conducted within village “self help groups” 
 Nature making bad surprises during the projects, like water flow in building lands or 
disturbed fish mating 
 Other not human actors7 which play a vital role in the accountability of the project : fish 
bowl, solar dryer, village accounting copy book, etc. 
The “front line” of the project extends very quickly at the beginning, from aid of children 
exposed to abuse risk, to widows with children help, then to rehabilitating whole families of 
deprived tribal groups as Irulas, etc, as exposed in Appendix 2. Nevertheless, as we are going 
to establish it below, this large-scale stability does not exclude permanent minor moves and 
adjustment of the front line. Observing some uneasiness concerning cross-cultural reporting, 
we discover that fraud obsession creates paradoxical “transparency” effects in spite of which 
the steering committee seems to have remained relatively lucid concerning projects impact. 
                                                 
6
 By emergency NGO we mean an NGO that is focused on emergency situations like wars or famines or 
earthquakes . In this case NGO members are nutritionists, doctors, firemen, etc. After a short mission in the field 
such NGO members leave the operations field . By sustainability oriented NGO we mean an Organization whose 
members remain in the field for years and act, independently from any  
catastrophe, in the sense of developing deprived populations. NGO members are educators, teachers, 
agronomists, etc. 
7
 Actor Network Theory calls such tools “not human actors” in so far as they contribute to the networking of 
remote realities (like European managers) and local realities (like Indian widows and fish selling). 
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 Uneasiness with reporting: fraud obsession vs. search for efficiency 
 Interviews show that European managers and “governors” fill quite ill at ease with 
local reports. At the beginning, the top project leader had to insist to obtain written tracks: 
“They would have only made oral reports”.  During the first semesters, reports were “full of 
useless details” and lacked crucial information expected by the European size. Examination of 
the successive narrative and financial reports reveals continuous enrichment of report with 
figures and diverse listings, but there is hardly any analysis or contextual explanation. For 
example, tuition and rescue action for village people that were living together in shelters 
shortly after tsunami is reported in listing forms showing esoteric disease nouns with people’s 
first names. Without any supplementary analysis, such data are valueless for the top project 
manager. However, that is what he received after having asked for more details about this 
particular project and retrospectively, with hindsight on many similar cases during the project, 
he thinks that, in general, Indian interlocutors are “listings addicted”. 
 On the contrary, but this occurs only with one local NGO officer, some reports may be 
quite long and detailed. But their structure looks quite inappropriate for the European pilot, as 
far as they mainly consist in long figure series, followed by some very  “naïve” true stories 
about victims and the benefit they personally received thanks to aid. For example, it is 
possible to read the really moving and stirring story of a grandmother bringing up herself a 9-
years old grand daughter who can afford school fee and school uniform, thanks to a bread 
cooking business whose cooking material the NGO paid for, with very cute pictures of the 
characters (and the breads) of this true story. The more recent the reports are, the more 
accurate figures there are about the number of helped children, of people attending each self-
help group education meeting, showing a growing importance of quantitative data inside 
reports. Nevertheless, there is still neither any second-degree content in reports, like analysis 
of strength and weaknesses of the project, nor any search for permanent features or efficiency 
patterns. That looks quite surprising if we consider the level of responsibility of the local 
NGO managers who wrote the reports. 
 At the steering committee level, budgets and broad analytic sections (corresponding to 
the nature of help delivered to villages) are consolidated in order to measure gaps between 
budget and realization. Reallocations of funds are the main decision taken. But these 
decisions do not take reporting figures as the only criteria. They also are based on qualitative 
knowledge and feelings that members of the steering committee have collected when going 
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themselves into the Indian villages for inspection. Members of the committee think they 
cannot exert any appropriate governance without periodical direct contact, because the key 
issue is, from their point of view, not transparency but confidence. Confidence is beyond a 
vain ambition of absolute transparency: “there is a point where you must stop asking 
questions, you must stop trying to grasp [unreachable reality]” (interview). 
 A more precise look at some project, for example education delivery for widows to 
launch own fish-selling business, may give us insight on the vanity of exhaustive reporting. In 
one village named “Anichakuppam”, self-help groups of widows are educated and 
accompanied in microcredit. Being widows, these women were rejected by local community 
and could not afford scholarship for their children after tsunami. Launching any trade 
business was not possible because of such a lack of fund that they even could not buy their 
first stock of of fish to begin business. NGO n°1 helped them building a self help group in 
order to get working capital through microcredit at a local bank. Thanks to this, widows have 
become fish sellers on Pondichéry market and offer better life conditions and scholarship to 
children (which is compatible with French NGO Federation official aims). This is supposed to 
prevent the latter from abuse, which is the aim of NGO n°1. 
 From seashore to the market it is possible to see directly this business happen, as well 
as to get narratives from the widows describing their business. If we reconstruct the cash 
flows that support as well NGO’s help and fish business, two characteristics appear (See 
diagram on Appendix 3). Firstly, fraud looks very unlikely, as far as every cash transfer from 
NGO to widows is controlled by banks and every microcredit fund is registered in self-help 
group copy books that every body can check (as we did). No loss of fund through corruption 
seems possible. Secondly, one cash flow and one cash cycle exist separately: on the one hand, 
there is cash flow from France to local NGO n°1, which pays self-help group education, and 
on the other hand, there is the endogenous cash cycle of fish selling business, that microcredit 
made only possible to begin by the furniture of initial working capital. The only source of 
“deviation” would be the link between both cash circuits, which is the efficiency of the 
education that social workers deliver to each self-help group so that the latter be able to 
launch business. As transponders from one circuit to another, social workers are the key link 
in the actor-network, connecting French donators and helped Indian widows. 
 From this point of view, the design of the local NGO reports received in Europe looks 
no more strange but quite reasonable: lists of meeting members and self help groups margins 
are the optimal “scripts” that a distant pilot could have at disposal, in order to measure 
quantitatively the quality of transmissions from donators cash flow to fish selling cash cycle. 
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Local NGO managers have chosen the best way of giving the proof that there is no fraud in 
the use of donators’ fund. We can now re-interpret the uneasiness created by reporting in 
terms of “translations”. Facing European cash providers that seek for quantitative look on 
resources expenditures and control management by gaps, local NGOs try to translate their 
activity into what they think to be the key concern of the formers: the fraud, a well-known 
endemic plague in India. In order to reach this finality, they fill the only script gap between 
donators and beneficiaries by figures quantifying the qualitative connexion between both cash 
circuits, and as such re-establish the script connectivity of the actor-network (we have 
symbolized this script connection by drawing gears on Appendix 3 diagram). 
 A “translation tragedy” consists in the fact that, from (European members) governance 
point of view, the key issue is no more fraud, but efficiency and organizational learning. What 
they would like to know is at which level their help affects the children’s life quality and 
development. If we map the scripts that converge to the stirring committee (see Appendix 4), 
we can note that this computing centre does not focus at the metric delivered by local NGOs, 
but tries to connect, for each project, consolidated budgets and consolidated expenses, with 
hindsight provided by in the field inspections, which looks both compulsory and daring. 
 
 Institutionalization from micro to meso level: Transparency is 
opacity 
 However, search for transparency looks even more vain if we try to compare what 
these widows actually do (performative aspect) with what is shown to the project governance 
(ostensive aspect), through intermediate “scripts” or artefacts. Although fish selling margins 
are accounted in the village and consolidated inside narrative reports, what is accounted for is 
not fish and its real margin, but a central non human actor: the bowl in which widows 
measure their purchase and store it. Fishermen sell indeed fish by bids that women make to by 
bowls of mixed fish. The result of the bid is the purchase price, which is accounted on the 
self-help group copy book that banks look at. Then the accounted margin is calculated as a 
fixed percentage of the purchase price, which means that accounted margins vary only 
according to the quantity of fish and the result of the bids, so that the metrology of this trade 
is based on bowls. However, what widows sell is fish, not bowl. They explained us that, after 
having bought it from fishermen, they spent some time to sort out every fish according to its 
species and size, in order to sell it in detail at maximum price. That means that nobody but 
herself knows the actual cash got by each woman when she sells fish, so that the actual 
margin is usually higher than what is accounted. Why do widows in-script bowls and not fish 
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? Many reasons are likely: perhaps they want to build confidence with bank through smooth 
margins, perhaps they want to maintain solidarity inside the self-help group by the avoidance 
of any profit difference among them. 
 Anyway, this fish-selling case illustrates the extent to which transparency is at the 
same time opacity (see fig. 2 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2: Transparency is opacity: institutionalization through translation / “trahison” 
phenomenon 
 
 Performative aspect: widows translate fish into bowl when they account daily business. 
Artefact : this in-scription is transmitted to European actors. Ostensive aspect: the de-scription 
of the accounts leads to believe that widows earn Rs 100 margin for Rs 1000 purchase, in 
contradiction with what really happens (but this may not be known by anybody). The 
consistency of “bowl metrology” warrants that nobody could ever contest the accounts, so 
that a total transparency effect is institutionalized. The magic operation that allows to produce 
transparency through opacity is what makes networking possible: translation. 
The ostensive : what  is acknowledged as 
the fish selling business
The performative : what  widows really do
The artifact : what the accounts show
I buy fish bowl for RS 
1000 and then sell each 
fish according to its own 
detail price. My margin 
varies
But I know banks 
prefer regular 
revenues so that I 
account only
Rs 1200 turnover
Turnover     Rs 1200 
Purchase Rs 1000
Bank refund Rs 100
Earning Rs 100
I read that widows 
make Rs 100 
margin and are 
able to refund bank
In-scription
De-scription
The script (AKRICH)  or “artifact” (FELDMAN)
But Isn’t that 
too beautiful to 
be true ?
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 Finally, the attitude of the steering committee proves to be quite wise: making regular 
inspections and trying to understand aid mechanism better than lists of figures, is all the more 
relevant since accounting, as institutionalization of economical micro-events, is as well a 
measure as a construction of reality.  
CONCLUSION 
 Local NGO-managers explained us that self-help groups and local NGO were 
promoted by Rajiv Gandhi because he had noticed that, among Rs 100 allocated by the 
government for deprived populations, only Rs 13 reached the final welfare recipient. At a 
large scale, the studied project illustrates the liberal governance phenomenon exposed by 
PESQUEUX (2007), in which states give up more and more sovereignty to NGOs, according to 
the never contested principle of efficiency. 
 At smaller scale, when we compare mesoscopic level (actor network dynamics) with 
microscopic level (what widows actually do), another aspect of liberalism appears. We 
discover that power is efficient if the centre (here: the steering committee) gives up total 
transparency and accepts a certain degree of latitude and ignorance of micro-events occurring 
at the operating level. Here we confirm a theoretical result discovered by Michel Foucault 
decades ago: management control, as a product of liberal “governmentality”, is more efficient 
if performed as security mechanism in the sense of Michel Foucault (FOUCAULT, 2004a) than 
as “discipline” tool (ibid.). Whereas a “discipline” mechanism is based on keeping a constant 
and suspicious watch over the people and what they do, “security mechanism” are based on 
confidence in self regulation and consist only in discontinuous and periodic controls.  In the 
case we studied, security mechanism both relies on and is limited by the irreducible 
phenomenon of translation.  
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APPENDIX 1 : RESEARCH SETTINGS 
 
 
 
 Action Person Place Duration 
(hours) 
Date 
Europe Individual 
interviews 
NGO Project leader Paris 2 17/11/2008 
Superstore Owner Blois (France) 2 12/11/2008 
NGO Project leader Paris  
 
2 03/10/2008 
NGO Project leader Paris  
 
2 17/06/ 2008 
NGO Project leader Paris  
 
2 05/06/ 2008 
NGO Project leader Paris  
 
2 17/04/2008 
Collective 
interviews 
-General Secretary of  Lateral 
NGO  
-Manager for Asia 
Bruxelles  
 
3 29 /10/2008 
India Individual 
interviews 
 
Local NGO n°1 Manager 
Pondichery (India) 
NGO office 
4  07/07/2008 
Local NGO n°2 Coordinator Village Tuition Center 
New Tsunami Nagel 
Suburb of Pondichéry 
3  08/07/2008 
Collective 
interviews 
Local NGO n°1  Members 
(child and human animators) 
Pondichéry 
NGO Office 
1  07/07/2008 
Local NGO n°2  Managers and 
Board Members 
- Vice-president 
- Coordinator 
- Chief executiv 
Pondichéry 
NGO Office 
3  09/07/2008 
Observations Local NGO n°1 Coordinator Anichakuppam 
Suburb of Pondichéry 
1  07/07/2008 
Local NGO n°2  Members 
(child and human animators) 
Pachiyankuppam 
Suburb of Pondichéry 
1  08/07/2008 
Local NGO n°2 Coordinator Devanampattinam 
Suburb of Pondichéry 
1  08/07/2008 
Local NGO n°1  Members 
(child and human animators) 
Pondichéry 0,5 10/07/2008 
Local NGO n°3 Helped village Sivanpedaiveedhi 
Suburb of Chennai 
1  11/07/2008 
Local NGO n°3 Helped village 
and school 
Sadayankuppam 
Suburb of Chennai 
0,5 11/07/2008 
Local NGO n°3 Helped village Thadavukarakuppam 
Suburb of Chennai 
0,5 11/07/2008 
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Appendix 2 : The “Front Line” of “Tsunami” projects portfolio 
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Appendix 3: How local NGO try to articulate French donator’s cash flow and Indian widows’ 
fish selling cash cycle  
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Appendix 4: Cash flows and reporting script paths 
 
   
W
idow
F
isherm
en
S
elf H
elp G
roup
Indian B
anks
Local N
G
O
International B
ank
E
uropean N
G
O
S
uperstore federal M
anagem
ent
S
uperstore federate O
w
ner
C
lient
D
onates €1
S
upplem
ents €1
C
ollects €
2,6 M
D
ispatches 
am
ong projects
R
eceives cash 
and A
ccounts A
sks for paym
ent 
(invoices and salaries)T
ransfers cash
pays
S
uppliers and social w
orkers
W
ages
O
w
n cash
B
orrow
R
s
10000
C
up of F
ish
D
ispatch
(W
orking capital)
R
S
 1000 
B
uys
F
ish
S
ells on city 
m
arket
R
etained m
argin
m
argin affected 
to pay back
R
S
 1000
F
ish consum
er
gets and 
pays
pays 
school 
fees
C
ollects
P
ays back
C
apital 
+
 interest
A
ccounting copy book
(detail  and 
consolidation)
F
inancial and 
narrative report
C
onsolidates for each 
group and trim
ester into
C
onfronts into 
report about
B
undle of 
budgets
G
et inform
ation about 
use of retained m
argin
S
teering 
com
m
ittee
E
xpenses 
realizations, 
im
pact
R
eports on fund use 
and im
pact
Legend : 
C
ash F
low
 
S
cript path
Legend : 
C
ash F
low
 
S
cript path
